Legal Changes and Repressive Measures

During the reporting period, Russia adopted and enforced highly repressive laws aimed at restricting the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals under the pretext of combating “non-traditional values.” Below is a summary of the key legal changes and enforcement measures:

Expansion of the “LGBT Propaganda” Ban (2022): At the end of 2022, the State Duma and the President approved amendments that fully banned the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” among all age groups [source: hrw.org / reuters.com]. The new law effectively prohibits any public expression of LGBTQ+ identity or discussion of LGBTQ+ topics—whether in the media, online, in books, films, or advertisements. While a similar law passed in 2013 applied only to minors, the 2022 amendments extended the restriction to society as a whole [source: hrw.org].

The law imposes significant administrative fines—up to 400,000 rubles for individuals and up to 5 million rubles for organizations. In 2023–2024, courts issued 257 penalties under this article (compared to just 22 in 2021–2022) [source: hrw.org], imposing fines that totaled more than 63 million rubles [source: hrw.org]. Any positive or even neutral information about LGBTQ+ people now falls under the ban. For example, in 2023–2024, bookstores and online streaming platforms were fined for selling or showing works featuring LGBTQ+ characters [source: hrw.org / ovd.info]. The 2022 amendments are clearly intended to eliminate LGBTQ+ topics from Russia’s public space entirely [source: reuters.com].

Ban on Gender Transition (2023): Under the banner of protecting “traditional values,” the Russian authorities targeted the rights of transgender individuals in mid-2023. In July 2023, a law was unanimously passed and signed that bans both medical gender transition and the legal recognition of gender identity. The law prohibits any medical interventions “aimed at changing a person’s sex,” including hormone therapy and surgery, and also forbids changing gender markers in official documents. Exceptions are allowed only for the treatment of congenital anomalies. The law also mandates the annulment of previously registered marriages if one of the spouses has changed their gender, and prohibits transgender people from serving as guardians or adoptive parents. The bill’s sponsors justified it as part of a fight against the “anti-family ideology of the West,” calling gender transition “pure satanism.” This ban has stripped thousands of transgender people of access to essential medical care and legal recognition—an act human rights defenders have described as a grave violation of human rights [source: ilga-europe.org]. The consequences were swift: a survey of 816 transgender Russians revealed that after the 2023 ban, they faced a sharp decline in access to healthcare, the inability to change official documents, and increased discrimination; many now view emigration as their only option [source: ilga-europe.org].


Designation of the LGBTQ+ Movement as “Extremist” (2023): The most radical step taken to date was the decision by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on November 30, 2023, to grant a request from the Ministry of Justice and recognize a non-existent “international LGBTQ+ movement” as an extremist organization. This unprecedented ruling effectively equated any collective activity in defense of LGBTQ+ rights with extremism. The wording is deliberately vague—the term “LGBTQ+ movement” can apply to any LGBTQ+ community or activity, providing the authorities with a pretext to bring criminal charges against virtually any openly gay, lesbian, or transgender person, as well as their allies.

Under Article 282.2 of the Russian Criminal Code, participation in the activities of an extremist organization is punishable by up to six years in prison. Human rights defenders warn that it is now sufficient to label someone a “member of the movement” in order to imprison them. The Supreme Court’s decision has rendered virtually all legal LGBTQ+ activity in Russia impossible. As Igor Kochetkov, head of the now-dissolved Russian LGBT Network, noted, “All lawful forms of work by LGBTQ+ organizations have become impossible.” LGBTQ+ symbols have also been banned: the rainbow flag has been officially declared an extremist symbol [source: hrw.org]]. Punishments began within weeks of the ruling: in January 2024, a court in Nizhny Novgorod sentenced a woman to five days in jail for posting a rainbow flag on social media [source: hrw.org], and a man in St. Petersburg was fined for using a rainbow-themed avatar [source: hrw.org].

According to human rights organizations, by mid-2025, more than 100 court rulings had been issued on charges of “extremism” for alleged involvement in the LGBTQ+ movement [source: hrw.org]. Individuals prosecuted under these charges have been added to the federal list of extremists, resulting in frozen bank accounts and restricted rights. Notably, the Supreme Court proceedings were held behind closed doors, without the presence of any defendants, and petitions from actual LGBTQ+ activists to participate in the case were rejected on the grounds of the “defendant’s absence.” In doing so, the authorities have created a convenient legal instrument for cracking down on any expression of LGBTQ+ identity, under the guise of combating “extremism.”

Expansion of the “Foreign Agent” Law Enforcement: In parallel with other measures, the authorities intensified pressure on non-governmental organizations and individuals through the “foreign agent” mechanism. In December 2022, a new law on foreign influence came into force, allowing almost any activist or organization to be designated as a “foreign agent” [source: hrw.org]. LGBTQ+ groups were among the first to be targeted. As early as 2021, the Ministry of Justice added major LGBTQ+ organizations—such as the interregional Russian LGBT Network—to the foreign agent registry [source: hrw.org], and in 2022–2023, the number of targeted individuals and organizations increased further. According to monitoring by the group Vykhod (Coming Out), at least 10 individuals and 8 NGOs were designated “foreign agents” in 2023 alone specifically for their work on LGBTQ+ issues [source: ilga-europe.org].

Being labeled a foreign agent subjects activists to constant inspections and restrictions: they face fines and even criminal prosecution for the slightest violation of strict requirements (such as labeling all publications and reporting on financial expenditures). For example, LGBTQ+ activist Yaroslav Rasputin was included in the foreign agent registry for his human rights work; his attempt to challenge the decision was rejected by the Moscow City Court in March 2025 [source: hrw.org]. Court rulings regarding foreign agent status explicitly cite individuals’ links to the so-called “international LGBT movement” [source: hrw.org]. In this way, the authorities are using the foreign agent law as a tool to further marginalize LGBTQ+ activism—framing it as “serving foreign interests” and portraying human rights defenders as enemies of the state.

Enforcement of New Repressive Measures (2022–2025): The enforcement of newly adopted repressive laws between 2022 and 2025 has been marked by demonstrative cruelty. In addition to fines, authorities began imposing arrests and real prison sentences. In April 2024, the first criminal cases related to “LGBT extremism” were reported—employees of a nightclub were detained and charged with “organizing the activities of an extremist organization” simply for hosting LGBTQ+ parties [source: ovd.info]. By the spring of 2025, both administrative and criminal charges were actively used to intimidate the community. In 2024 alone, courts issued fines totaling 25 million rubles for “LGBT propaganda” [source: svoboda.org], with individual fines reaching up to 200,000 rubles and corporate penalties up to 2 million [source: svoboda.org]. In addition to prosecutions, authorities have systematically blocked LGBTQ+-related information resources. Immediately following the adoption of the 2022 law, hundreds of LGBTQ+-themed websites were blocked, social media communities were banned, and even artistic works were censored. Under pressure from censors, for instance, the Bolshoi Theatre removed the ballet Nureyev—a production dedicated to the legendary bisexual dancer—from its repertoire. Bookstores were ordered to withdraw dozens of titles containing LGBTQ+ content [source: hrw.org]. In May 2025, major publishing houses instructed retailers to remove 37 book titles deemed incompatible with the new moral standards—including global bestsellers and literary classics—if they contained any reference, even indirect, to LGBTQ+ themes [source: hrw.org].

Over the past three years, the legal framework in Russia has become not just covertly but openly discriminatory toward LGBTQ+ citizens. Under the guise of combating “extremism” and “propaganda,” the state has enshrined inequality in law and subjected a significant segment of the population to persecution simply for their identity. These laws contradict international human rights standards, as noted by the United Nations and leading human rights organizations [source: hrw.org], yet the Russian authorities have blatantly disregarded such criticism.

In the following section, we examine how these new bans have affected the everyday lives of LGBTQ+ people in society.

Social Conditions: Discrimination, Violence, and Public Attitudes

Since 2022, the social climate for LGBTQ+ people in Russia has sharply deteriorated. State-sponsored homophobic propaganda and newly adopted repressive laws have triggered a surge in everyday discrimination and violence [source: svoboda.org]. Human rights defenders point to a direct correlation: each time a new homophobic legal provision is introduced, a rise in hate crimes is recorded across society [source: svoboda.org].

Below are key facts that reflect the status of LGBTQ+ individuals in Russian society from 2022 to 2025.

Increase in Violence and Threats: According to a large-scale study conducted by the group Vykhod (Coming Out) and the Sphere Foundation, the number of LGBTQ+ individuals who experienced some form of violence or pressure due to their sexual orientation or gender identity rose from 30% in 2022 to 43.5% in 2023. In other words, nearly one in two respondents in 2023 reported being subjected to aggression or harassment stemming from homophobia or transphobia. A particularly notable increase was recorded in threats of physical violence, rising from 20% to 24% within one year [source: meduza.io]. Direct physical violence was reported by 8% of LGBTQ+ respondents in 2023 (compared to approximately 7% in the previous year). Among transgender individuals, the rate of those who reported being physically assaulted was even higher—13% in 2023 [source: meduza.io].

The North Caucasus remains the most dangerous region: 17% of LGBTQ+ respondents there reported experiencing physical violence (up from 12% in 2022), and a record 42% received direct threats (compared to 22% the year before) [source: meduza.io]. High levels of homophobic threats were also reported in the Russian Far East (31%) and the South of Russia (29%). The most common incidents involved verbal abuse and threats from strangers in public, online harassment, and death wishes—often due to one’s “non-conforming” appearance. There were also reports of sexualized violence: 8% of respondents in 2023 reported experiencing such attacks. Despite this, very few victims seek assistance. Only 14% of those who faced homophobic or transphobic crimes reported the incident to the police—and among those who did, only 4% saw their case reach court. This deep mistrust in law enforcement is explained by the fact that police often ignore such complaints or even participate in the persecution of LGBTQ+ individuals. There have been documented cases where gay men who reported assaults were instead threatened with charges under the “LGBT propaganda” law [source: ilga-europe.org].

Everyday Discrimination and Denial of Services: In addition to direct violence, everyday discrimination has become more widespread. One in five LGBTQ+ individuals reported being denied medical care or facing rude behavior from doctors after disclosing their identity [source: ilga-europe.org]. Nineteen percent of LGBTQ+ patients noted biased treatment from medical personnel, with the figure rising to approximately 29% among transgender respondents. Since the beginning of the war, access to essential medications has become more difficult: nearly one-third of respondents (32%) indicated that the war had disrupted their ability to obtain necessary drugs, rising to 46% among transgender individuals—particularly in relation to hormone therapy [source: meduza.io].

There have also been documented cases of service denial. For instance, in St. Petersburg, a gym refused entry to a trans man into the men’s locker room, demanding proof of surgery despite the fact that he held a male passport [source: ilga-europe.org]. In the workplace and service industries, employees often make offensive remarks with impunity. The absence of anti-discrimination legislation related to SOGI (sexual orientation and gender identity) means LGBTQ+ citizens are not legally protected from dismissal or denial of employment based on their identity.

There are numerous reports of teachers and doctors being fired after their homosexuality was revealed—especially in more conservative regions—officially justified by claims of “immoral behavior.” By 2023, the proportion of LGBTQ+ individuals who disclosed neither their orientation nor gender identity at work had risen to 40%, with many choosing to conceal themselves out of fear of harassment or job loss.

Official Rhetoric and Its Impact on Society: Homophobic sentiments in Russian society are actively fueled by direct state propaganda. President Vladimir Putin and other top officials have repeatedly made harsh public statements against LGBTQ+ people. Since the beginning of the war, the Kremlin has constructed the image of a “collective West” allegedly seeking to destroy Russia from within by imposing “non-traditional” values. Putin, in particular, has accused Western countries of moving “toward open Satanism,” citing the advancement of gay and transgender rights as an example. Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church has gone so far as to claim that “gay pride parades” have become a kind of litmus test for loyalty to the West, and that the war in Ukraine is about the salvation of souls and determining “whose side humanity will end up on—God’s or the devil’s” [source: hrw.org].

In 2023, State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov openly threatened to “eliminate LGBT people” [source: ilga-europe.org], and Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko stated that transgender people should be subjected to “mandatory treatment” [source: ilga-europe.org]. Such statements by high-ranking officials not only stigmatize the LGBTQ+ community but also embolden radicalized citizens to commit acts of violence. According to surveys, public opinion in recent years has become even more intolerant of LGBTQ+ individuals: more than half of Russians now hold strongly negative views of LGBTQ+ people, and the proportion of those who believe that gays and lesbians should have equal rights has dropped to 30%—down from 50% two decades ago [source: ilga-europe.org]. Around two-thirds of respondents say they fear their children or grandchildren might be “exposed to homosexual propaganda,” and more than 50% claim they would end or severely limit communication with someone if they discovered that person was gay. This wave of homophobic hysteria is largely the result of a deliberate campaign: state media and government officials continuously portray LGBTQ+ people as enemies of the family, a cause of the demographic crisis, and a “fifth column” of the West. As a result, the public consciousness has absorbed the image of LGBTQ+ individuals as alien and dangerous elements—against whom “anything goes.”

Specific Cases of Discrimination and Attacks: A tragic example of the extreme extent of hatred is found in events in Chechnya. Since 2017, the Chechen Republic has been known for carrying out de facto extrajudicial punishments against suspected gay men—abductions and torture by security forces have been documented, along with several killings [source: ilga-europe.org]. These practices did not disappear during the reporting period: in February 2023, Idris Arsamikov, a gay Chechen activist, was detained in Moscow after returning from exile to attend his father’s funeral. He was forcibly sent back to Chechnya, and his fate remains unknown. There are unconfirmed reports suggesting he may have been sent to the frontlines of the war.

This case illustrates the extreme danger LGBTQ+ individuals face outside of major cities. In parts of the North Caucasus, being openly gay or transgender remains life-threatening—people are persecuted as if they were criminals, simply because of their identity. Even outside the Caucasus, attacks by far-right groups on LGBTQ+ events have become more frequent. Between December 2023 and February 2024, police carried out raids in several cities—including Moscow, Yekaterinburg, and Krasnoyarsk—targeting private LGBTQ+ parties and nightclubs. Security forces stormed venues, shut down events, recorded the personal data of all attendees, and detained several individuals [source: hrw.org]. As a result, many queer spaces have been forced to close.

For example, in February 2024, the well-known queer bar Elton in Krasnoyarsk announced its closure following a police raid and the arrest of its staff [source: ohchr.org]. There was also a report of the first actual prison sentence under the new homophobic legislation: a resident of Kaluga was sentenced to three years in a penal colony for posting online materials considered “LGBT propaganda” and “extremist symbols” (a rainbow flag) [source: hrw.org]. Homophobic domestic violence also remains widespread: about 14% of LGBTQ+ respondents reported experiencing violence from family members due to their sexual orientation or gender identity [source: meduza.io]. One widely reported case occurred in Dagestan: a young lesbian woman attempted to escape persecution from her family, but police returned her to her relatives twice—despite clear threats of an “honor killing” [source: state.gov]. Such incidents highlight the complete lack of protection for LGBTQ+ individuals—both from private aggressors and from the state itself.

Psychological Well-being and Concealment: Under constant pressure and aggression, many LGBTQ+ individuals in Russia are forced to lead closeted lives. In 2023, the number of people open with friends and loved ones dropped significantly: while in the previous year 49% of respondents had come out to most of their friends, this figure fell to just 43% [source: meduza.io]. Only 13% are open with their relatives (down from 14% in 2022).

An increasing number of people also choose not to disclose their orientation or gender identity at work or school—40% in 2023, a 3-point increase over the previous year [source: meduza.io]. This reflects a growing atmosphere of fear: even within their trusted circles, LGBTQ+ individuals have become more cautious. They are afraid to speak openly about themselves, fearing denunciation or rejection. This enforced secrecy and the constant need to pretend have a negative impact on mental health. Human rights organizations report a rise in stress-related disorders, depression, and anxiety among LGBTQ+ youth amid the ongoing hate campaign [source: ilga-europe.org].

Access to mental healthcare is also severely limited. State-employed psychologists are required to report LGBTQ+ clients to the police if their identity is disclosed—under threat of being accused themselves of promoting “LGBT propaganda.” As a result, many are left to cope alone or seek support through unofficial, underground means.

Overall, the social situation of the LGBTQ+ community in Russia has sharply deteriorated since the beginning of the war. Levels of violence and hostility have increased, public life has been driven almost entirely underground, and millions of people live in an atmosphere of fear and rejection. Surveys confirm this negative shift in public consciousness: as of 2024, Russia ranked last in Europe in terms of LGBTQ+ safety (69th out of 69 countries in the Rainbow Europe ranking) [source: ovd.info]. Nevertheless, even under these conditions, there are activists and organizations working to resist discrimination. Their situation will be examined in the following section.

Pressure on NGOs and Activists

By 2025, LGBTQ+ activism in Russia has been nearly extinguished under the pressure of state repression. Nevertheless, prior to the complete crackdown, many human rights defenders and NGOs continued their work despite mounting pressure. Below are the key trends in LGBTQ+ activism and the situation of non-profit organizations during this period.

Dismantling of Organizations and Shift to the Underground: Even before 2022, the authorities had systematically weakened the LGBTQ+ movement through the “foreign agent” law, denial of NGO registration, and bans on public events. The war and the new wave of repression completed the dismantling of the movement’s infrastructure.

The largest network, the Russian LGBT Network, was labeled a “foreign agent” in 2021 and announced the suspension of its public activities in early 2022. In 2022–2023, several prominent organizations were forced to shut down or go underground. For example, in St. Petersburg, the charitable foundation Sphere, which had supported LGBTQ+ individuals for many years, ceased official operations after being added to the registry of “undesirable organizations” in April 2022 (due to receiving support from abroad).
In November 2023, immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision to designate the “LGBT movement” as extremist, the human rights collective LGBT+ Case announced its self-dissolution. Since 2022, the group had provided free legal assistance to queer individuals and had handled over 200 cases [source: hrw.org]. The team stated that continuing to defend LGBTQ+ rights publicly under the new legal conditions had become impossible—lawyers themselves now risk prosecution.
The same fate befell other initiatives: many moved their operations online or relocated abroad, formally announcing closure to protect participants from persecution. According to expert estimates, about one-quarter of the most visible LGBTQ+ activists left the country after the start of the war; the rest went silent.

Locally, only small, semi-underground support groups remain, often operating anonymously. Organizing rallies or Pride events has long been impossible—officially banned since 2013—but in the past, activists at least attempted to apply for permits or held solo pickets. Now, any public activity is met with immediate arrest. Between 2022 and 2024, not a single LGBTQ+ picket was officially approved; on the contrary, there have been documented cases of people being detained simply for standing on the street with a blank rainbow-colored sign. In effect, activism has moved into social media and private apartments—but even in those spaces, it remains under close surveillance by law enforcement.

Persecution of Activists: The authorities have deployed the full arsenal of laws to personally target public figures and opinion leaders. In addition to assigning the “foreign agent” label (as discussed above), LGBTQ+ defenders are increasingly being subjected to administrative and criminal prosecution.
For example, in September 2022, police in Kaliningrad detained the administrators of a local LGBTQ+ social media page, charging them with “distribution of pornography”—formally due to links shared in the group to sex education websites. In 2023, a criminal case was opened in Tyumen against a lesbian woman for “rehabilitation of Nazism” after she posted a photo of a kiss in front of the Eternal Flame memorial on social media. Investigators deemed it an offense to the memory of the war dead—she now faces real prison time.

In Moscow in 2024, two employees of a bar known for being LGBTQ+-friendly were arrested and charged under the article on “organizing an extremist community”—in practice, for hosting queer parties [source: ovd.info]. Security forces also employ psychological pressure and blackmail. There have been cases where NGO staff were summoned for “conversations” by the FSB, during which they were urged to cease their work or faced threats against family members. Many activists report being subjected to surveillance and phone tapping.

A telling example is that of Igor Kochetkov, one of Russia’s most prominent LGBTQ+ activists and the head of the Russian LGBT Network. Between 2021 and 2022, radical anti-LGBTQ+ groups filed complaints against him, and he was added to the list of foreign agents. In 2023, following the designation of the “LGBT movement” as extremist, Kochetkov left Russia for good. He publicly stated, “In 2024, I automatically became an extremist simply because I am an LGBTQ+ person” [source: svoboda.org].

Hundreds of others find themselves in a similar situation. For instance, Kirill Timoshenko, a leader of the Vesna movement in St. Petersburg, also emigrated after being labeled an extremist by Russian authorities for expressing support for LGBTQ+ rights. Today, activists face a coordinated set of legal accusations: “foreign agent,” “extremist,” “LGBT propagandist”—stigmatizing labels used to isolate them from society and destroy their reputations.

Continuing Work in New Forms: Despite mounting pressure, some LGBTQ+ initiatives in Russia continue to operate by adapting to the new reality. Several organizations have re-registered abroad and now provide assistance remotely—for example, psychological support projects for queer people now operate online from safer countries. New channels of mutual aid have emerged: messenger groups, anonymous chats, and Telegram bots through which users can access legal or psychological consultations.
Russian LGBTQ+ activists have joined forces with human rights defenders in exile to lobby for international support. In 2023, a coalition of NGOs launched a campaign urging the European Union to simplify asylum procedures for persecuted queer individuals from Russia [source: ilga-europe.org]. Efforts to document rights violations are also ongoing: for instance, the human rights project OVD-Info regularly collects data on arrests made under “LGBT-related” charges and publishes guidance for those facing searches or court proceedings.

A few courageous individuals continue cultural activism—holding private apartment exhibitions, closed film screenings, and producing underground publications. However, such events are extremely risky and limited in scope. Most large-scale events (such as festivals and conferences) previously organized by the community have either been canceled or relocated abroad. Since 2022, the traditional international film festival “BokoBok” has been held online or in foreign venues, as Russian authorities block its organization within the country.

International response: Russian and international human rights organizations have strongly condemned the persecution of LGBTQ+ activists. At the UN, experts denounced the decision to label the LGBT movement as extremist and called for it to be overturned, describing it as a violation of fundamental freedoms [source: ohchr.org]. In December 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement urging Russia “not to use the law to perpetuate inequality and discrimination” and to repeal homophobic provisions [source: hrw.org]. Nevertheless, official Moscow continues to ignore these appeals, dismissing them as “interference in internal affairs.”

Many Western foundations that had previously funded LGBT projects in Russia were forced to cease operations after being declared “undesirable organizations.” In 2022, the Council of Europe expelled Russia from its ranks—citing, among other reasons, systematic human rights violations, including those against LGBTQ+ people. This cut off Russian activists from access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Russia has openly refused to comply with recent ECHR rulings on older cases [source: ilga-europe.org], although it has formally acknowledged some decisions (for example, it paid compensation to two women who were victims of a lesbophobic attack, following a demand from the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination [source: ilga-europe.org]).

As of 2025, LGBTQ+ activism in Russia is experiencing its darkest period in decades. Organizations have either been shut down or branded as “foreign agents” and “extremists.” Activists face the constant threat of arrest and are forced either into hiding or exile. Nevertheless, resistance has not been completely extinguished: pockets of solidarity and support still remain, and abroad, Russian LGBTQ+ human rights defenders continue the struggle, drawing international attention to the ongoing repression.

Differences Between Moscow and St. Petersburg and Other Regions of the Country

The situation of the LGBTQ+ community in Russia is not uniform—it differs significantly between major cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg) and provincial regions. It has traditionally been believed that the capitals offer a more tolerant environment and at least some “niches” for queer people, whereas in more rural areas, conservative views dominate and traditional pressures are stronger. Since the beginning of the war, these differences have persisted—and in some respects, have even intensified.

Moscow and St. Petersburg: The two largest cities in Russia have historically been the centers of the LGBTQ+ movement—home to the main organizations, semi-underground cultural events, and a greater number of queer-friendly venues. St. Petersburg is traditionally considered the most “open” city: according to a survey, 57% of LGBTQ+ respondents in St. Petersburg are out to most of their friends (compared to 50% in Moscow), and 19% are out to their relatives (15% in Moscow). Interestingly, in 2023 the level of openness in St. Petersburg remained roughly the same as the previous year, while in Moscow it dropped noticeably (e.g., the number of people out to friends fell by 6 percentage points).

This can be explained by different levels of pressure: Moscow is the political center, where police operations (raids, show trials) are more intense. Many Moscow-based LGBTQ+ activists have emigrated, while some initiatives in St. Petersburg still survive. Nonetheless, LGBTQ+ freedoms in both capital cities remain severely restricted. Clubs and bars that once served as community spaces are either shut down or forced to operate covertly (entry by guest list only, no advertising, photography banned inside, etc.). For instance, there are almost no publicly known gay clubs left in Moscow—repeated police inspections in recent years have led owners to close them for fear of repercussions. In 2022–2023, child welfare services in Moscow began removing children from same-sex couples (such families are not legally recognized, but some rainbow families used to live discreetly); now even the suspicion of a parent’s homosexuality can be grounds for pressure.

At the same time, it’s still easier to “find your people” in the big cities: there are secret queer apartments (for example, in St. Petersburg volunteers set up a shelter for teens kicked out of their homes due to their orientation), and friendly doctors and psychologists continue to treat queer patients without judgment. The internet and mobile apps remain channels for meeting others and organizing, though not without risk (in both Moscow and St. Petersburg, police provocateurs appear periodically, but the level of violence is lower than in the regions). Thus, Moscow and St. Petersburg remain relative “islands” where LGBTQ+ people still have a better chance of finding support and like-minded individuals—albeit under constant threat from the authorities.

Other Regions: Outside the major cities, the situation is often even more dire. In small towns and rural areas, LGBTQ+ people are significantly more isolated. Public rejection is nearly total, and living openly is virtually impossible. For example, in the North Caucasus (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan), gay men and lesbians are forced to hide their identities from their own families out of fear for their lives—“honor traditions” remain strong in those cultures, and relatives may resort to violence upon learning of such a “disgrace” [source: ilga-europe.org]. Danger also comes from the authorities: as previously mentioned, Chechnya saw violent “cleansing” campaigns targeting suspected gay men, and according to human rights defenders, selective executions and abductions continued until at least 2023 [source: ilga-europe.org].

While other regions may not see such extreme cases, levels of hostility remain high. According to research, the largest increase in physical violence in 2023 was recorded in the North Caucasus Federal District (rising from 12% to 17% of victims) [source: meduza.io], as well as in traditionally conservative districts like the Urals and southern Russia. These are also the areas where LGBTQ+ individuals most frequently report discrimination when applying for jobs or university admission.

Specialized support communities and queer-friendly spaces are almost nonexistent in the provinces. In many regional capitals, there is not a single openly LGBTQ+ venue or support center—especially after the national “LGBT Network” shut down its regional contacts. While in Moscow or St. Petersburg one might find a psychologist or doctor experienced in working with LGBTQ+ people, in the provinces, individuals are far more likely to face judgment or even outright refusal of service (for example, a doctor might invoke the “gay propaganda” law and decline to treat a transgender patient).

Social surveillance is also more intense in smaller towns—rumors spread quickly, and someone who comes out risks becoming the target of harassment by the entire community. In one Siberian town, for instance, after a teenager came out at school, the parents of other students demanded his expulsion, and local officials supported the decision, citing “immoral behavior.” Many LGBTQ+ teens in regional areas drop out of school due to bullying [source: meduza.io].

Access to information is also limited: regional libraries remove books with LGBTQ+ themes, and the local press does not cover queer issues—unless in a negative light. As a result, LGBTQ+ people in the regions experience an even greater sense of isolation than those in the capitals. It is no coincidence that a large number of young queer people aspire to move to St. Petersburg, Moscow, or abroad at the first opportunity.

Differences in Law Enforcement: Although the laws are the same across the country, their interpretation and enforcement vary significantly at the local level. In major cities, judges and police sometimes show a degree of formal leniency—for instance, Moscow courts often issue fines under the “LGBT propaganda” law, whereas in provincial areas, authorities may immediately impose detention. The first administrative arrests for displaying the rainbow flag were recorded specifically in the regions (e.g., Nizhny Novgorod, Kaluga) [source: hrw.org].

Even in St. Petersburg, known for its relatively liberal reputation, some judges have handed down harsh sentences. In May 2025, a court fined a local bookstore 800,000 rubles for selling works by Susan Sontag and Olivia Laing—world-renowned authors whose books were deemed to constitute “LGBT propaganda” [source: hrw.org].

Overall, it can be said that outside the major cities, the enforcement of the increasingly homophobic law is even more arbitrary and severe. Local officials often seek to gain favor with higher authorities: for example, several rural schools reported firing teachers with “nontraditional sexual orientations” after their social media profiles were reviewed.

In some regions (such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), local governments have added their own initiatives to the federal measures. In 2023, authorities in Kazan attempted to pass a regional law banning any unofficial gatherings without prior approval—clearly aimed at suppressing underground LGBTQ+ parties after some were discovered in private apartments.

Thus, the life of an LGBTQ+ person in Russia largely depends on geography. In major cities, elements of subculture still exist and there is relatively more tolerance among certain segments of the population. In contrast, in smaller towns—and especially in the North Caucasus—there is virtually zero protection in terms of rights and safety. While the overall trend is negative across the board, the level of risk associated with coming out varies: in St. Petersburg, it might mean losing one’s job or facing public condemnation, whereas in Chechnya, it could cost a person their life. Nevertheless, even Moscow and St. Petersburg can no longer be considered safe. With the passage of laws in 2022–2023, the Russian government has effectively sought to turn the entire country into an “LGBT-free zone.”

Emigration and Asylum: The Exodus and the Fate of Those Who Left

Faced with increasing pressure, many LGBTQ+ individuals have chosen to leave Russia in search of safety. Since 2022, there has been a mass emigration of members of the LGBTQ+ community, especially young people and activists. The nature and scale of this exodus have unfolded in waves, driven by key events.

First Wave – Start of the War (Spring 2022): After February 2022, thousands of Russian citizens left the country in protest against the war and out of fear of repression for their anti-war stance. Among them was a significant number of LGBTQ+ activists and NGO professionals [source: spherequeer.org]. According to estimates from the Sphere Foundation, by mid-2022, more than 1,000 LGBTQ+ individuals from their respondent pool alone had left Russia [source: spherequeer.org]. Many human rights defenders evacuated key staff and documentation abroad in anticipation of a crackdown on their organizations.

This wave can be described as a preventive evacuation — people left while it was still relatively easy (visa restrictions had not yet fully taken effect, and air connections to many countries were still operational). The main destinations were neighboring countries like Georgia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan — which did not require visas for Russians and were relatively close culturally. Others left for the EU (especially Finland, the Baltics, and Germany), as well as Israel and the United States — if they had visas or financial means.

Second Wave – Mobilization (Autumn 2022): The “partial mobilization” announced in September 2022 triggered a mass exodus of draft-age men. Among those leaving the country were many LGBTQ+ individuals with male gender markers — especially gay, bisexual, and trans men — seeking to avoid conscription [source: spherequeer.orgspherequeer.org].

Firstly, participation in the war was fundamentally unacceptable for many on ethical or political grounds. Secondly, gay men feared hazing and violence within the military — open homophobia in the armed forces posed a serious threat to their safety. In the first weeks after the mobilization was declared, hundreds of thousands of citizens fled Russia, and a significant portion of the LGBTQ+ community was among them. Experts described it as a “loss of the community” — queer scenes in major cities emptied out noticeably [source: spherequeer.org].

Transgender men deserve particular mention: although they are formally listed as men and thus subject to the draft, they are typically ineligible for service due to medical grounds (e.g., hormone therapy). However, military conscription offices largely ignored these nuances. As a result, nearly all trans men of draft age either fled the country or sought exemptions on medical grounds [source: spherequeer.org].
Mobilization thus became a major catalyst for the departure of the male segment of the LGBTQ+ community.

Third Wave – New Legislation (Winter 2022/2023): The adoption of the law banning all so-called "LGBT propaganda" in November 2022, followed by discussions of a ban on gender transition in 2023, triggered the next wave of emigration [source: spherequeer.org]. Once it became clear that the situation would only worsen, many LGBTQ+ individuals who had still hoped to remain in Russia decided to leave.
In particular, transgender people began leaving en masse in spring and summer 2023, trying to emigrate and complete their transition in countries where it was still legally possible.

Before the transition ban came into force in July 2023, many rushed to update their legal documents and undergo surgeries within Russia — and those who didn’t manage in time left for countries with accessible medical care, such as Serbia, Thailand, and Armenia. According to the organization “Vyhod” (Coming Out), requests for assistance with emigration increased dramatically [source: spherequeer.org].

Alongside trans individuals, members of the artistic and LGBTQ+ creative communities also fled the country, fearing censorship and persecution. Several well-known drag performers left for neighboring states after their shows were banned in Russia. By 2024, this led to a substantial outflow of the country’s active LGBTQ+ community — with most major LGBTQ+ organizations having relocated their core teams abroad. Those who remained were mostly individuals unable to leave due to financial or family constraints.

Motives and Goals of Emigration: The primary motive is clear — personal safety. People are fleeing fear of arrest, violence, and harassment. For example, LGBTQ+ individuals interviewed by OVD-Info cited the desire “not to risk [their] freedom every single day just because of who [they] are” as a key reason for leaving [source: svoboda.orgsvoboda.org]. For transgender individuals, an additional motive is preserving their health — the inability to access hormones and medical assistance at home forces them to seek asylum in countries where care is available [source: ilga-europe.orgilga-europe.org].

Gay and lesbian couples often emigrate together to be able to live openly as a family: in Russia, their unions are not recognized, and there's even a risk of children being taken away from same-sex parents. Emigration becomes a means of survival for such families. Finally, the war and economic downturn have also played a role: some LGBTQ+ emigrants are IT professionals, designers, and scientists who left for broader political or economic reasons — but the growing climate of homophobia further deters them from returning.

Status and Challenges Abroad: The mass exodus of LGBTQ+ individuals from Russia has led to the emergence of new diasporas in other countries — Russian-speaking queer communities have formed in Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Israel, Turkey, and elsewhere. However, life in exile brings its own difficulties. Visa restrictions introduced by many Western countries in 2022–2023 made legal travel to Europe more difficult for Russians [source: ilga-europe.org]. For example, the Baltic states and the Czech Republic nearly ceased issuing tourist visas and, in some cases, even rejected asylum applications. Nevertheless, persecution on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity is recognized as a legitimate ground for asylum in many countries (EU, USA, Canada, etc.). As a result, many emigrants apply for refugee or asylum seeker status.

European NGOs have reported a rise in applications from Russian LGBTQ+ migrants seeking asylum [source: ilga-europe.org]. In July 2023, immediately after the ban on gender transitions, human rights groups submitted a petition to EU leadership requesting a simplified asylum procedure for transgender Russians [source: ilga-europe.org]. Some were indeed granted political asylum relatively quickly — for example, in Spain and France, dozens of applications from Russian LGBTQ+ activists were approved in 2022–2023.

However, the overall process remains slow: people often wait months for decisions from immigration authorities, frequently without the right to work during that time. Financial hardship is a major issue — according to research by the organization Vykhod, more than half of LGBTQ+ Russians who emigrated saw a significant drop in income and now live near the poverty line abroad [source: spherequeer.org].
Integration is not always easy: language barriers, non-recognition of diplomas, and the psychological stress of relocation make it difficult to find employment. Many continue working remotely for Russian or international companies just to survive.

Another pressing issue is visa status: some left Russia not as refugees but on tourist or student visas and hesitate to apply for asylum due to uncertainty. This creates the risk of deportation once their visas expire. For example, in Georgia and Turkey, many queer emigrants lived under temporary legal statuses in 2022–2023, renewing them annually but without access to social protections.

Support for Those Who Left: Fortunately, there are networks of solidarity in place. International organizations such as Rainbow Railroad, Amnesty International, and others have launched special assistance programs for queer refugees from Russia — ranging from covering travel expenses to providing temporary housing. In some Eastern European countries, volunteers have set up shelters for Russian LGBTQ+ individuals (such initiatives are active in Riga, Berlin, and Tbilisi).
The diaspora also plays a crucial role: those who left earlier support new arrivals with advice, contacts, and sometimes financial help. By 2025, a kind of “Russian LGBTQ+ exile community” has taken shape — tens of thousands of people united by the shared experience of displacement.
They continue cultural life abroad: small home concerts are held in Tbilisi and Yerevan, and art spaces have opened in Vilnius and Berlin to showcase the work of émigré artists. Some activists have relaunched their NGOs abroad — for instance, former members of the St. Petersburg-based organization “Vykhod” registered a new initiative in Lithuania, allowing them to work openly and apply for grants to support queer Russians.

Prospects of Return: According to surveys, the majority of LGBTQ+ emigrants have no plans to return to Russia in the near future [source: spherequeer.org]. Only about a quarter said they might consider returning if the situation improves. For now, as repressive laws remain in effect, these individuals are effectively political refugees. Some hold out hope for a change in government or the end of the war, which could open the door to reforms and greater safety. Others have already begun settling into life abroad and no longer see their future tied to their homeland.
As a result, Russia is losing a significant portion of its active and educated citizens — among them an entire generation of LGBTQ+ people who could have contributed to the country’s development. This “brain drain” is a direct consequence of policies rooted in discrimination and isolationism.

Conclusion

The period from early 2022 to spring 2025 has been a time of unprecedented assault on the rights of LGBTQ+ people in Russia. Under the pretext of war and the protection of “traditional values,” the state has enacted a series of laws that directly violate the dignity and freedoms of millions of citizens — from a complete ban on the public life of the LGBTQ+ community to its effective designation as a domestic “extremist” enemy. The legal framework was reshaped to legitimize discrimination: the concepts of “LGBT propaganda” and “extremism” became tools for censorship, punishment, and intimidation.

This shift in legislation was followed by a surge of societal hostility — cases of violence and harassment increased, and propaganda helped normalize hateful rhetoric in public discourse [source: svoboda.org; ilga-europe.org]. The activist movement was decimated: organizations were shut down or forced abroad; activists were branded as “foreign agents” and “extremists,” with many fleeing the country to escape repression. Regional differences became starker: while in some areas the situation merely deteriorated, in others — such as the North Caucasus — it descended into horror, with reports of extrajudicial executions [source: ilga-europe.org]. A wave of emigration drained the Russian LGBTQ+ community, but for many it offered a vital path to survival and a new beginning abroad.

All these developments align with the broader course pursued by the Russian leadership — one of conservative isolationism and authoritarian control over society. LGBTQ+ people have become a convenient scapegoat for diverting public attention from domestic issues and the war. Their image is deliberately demonized in order to unite the population against an internal “enemy.” This policy causes immense harm — not only to individuals, whose lives are broken and filled with suffering, but to society as a whole, by encouraging violence, tearing apart families, and undermining tolerance and humanism. International human rights organizations unanimously assert that the current situation is incompatible with Russia’s international obligations and deserves the strongest condemnation [source: hrw.org].

The prospects for improvement remain uncertain. Inside the country, there are few who can publicly defend LGBTQ+ rights — the voice of resistance now mostly comes from exile. However, history shows that such repressive campaigns are not eternal. The community persists, even underground, and people continue to find ways to support one another. Many still hope that the state's course will eventually change toward greater tolerance, because human dignity and the desire for freedom cannot be extinguished by laws or fear. LGBTQ+ people have always been and remain an integral part of Russian society — from large cities to remote villages — and many continue to live in Russia, openly or semi-openly, holding on to the hope for better days.

In conclusion, the situation of the LGBTQ+ community in Russia from 2022 to 2025 represents a systemic human rights crisis. The issue has gained international attention and serves as yet another clear indicator of the country’s authoritarian turn. The statistics, case studies, and testimonies presented in this report paint a grim picture: a rise in violence and discrimination, the subjugation of law to an ideology of hatred, and the forced departure of the active civil society [source: spherequeer.org]. At the same time, there remains hope that this situation will change over time — not only due to external pressure but also because of a growing internal demand for dignity and equality. For now, in spring 2025, LGBTQ+ people in Russia continue to live “under conditions of terror” (as accurately described in a human rights report) — and for many, solidarity and international support remain their only lifeline.