Kazakhstan: the law banning "LGBT propaganda" is being rewritten — just two weeks after taking effect
On March 2, Kazakhstan's ban on "propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation" came into force. Amendments were introduced across eight laws — on advertising, mass media, cinematography, online platforms and advertising, telecommunications, protection of children from harmful information, education, and culture. This means restrictions now cover virtually the entire information space: media outlets, social networks, online platforms, educational materials, film, and advertising.
The package of amendments was signed by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on December 30, 2025. Notably, the "LGBT propaganda" ban was embedded within a law on archival matters. The Mazhilis approved the norms on November 12, and the Senate backed them on December 18 — despite warnings from human rights defenders and documented cases of threats and aggression against LGBT people. The following is based on legal consultations and interviews conducted by BES.media.
What counts as propaganda
Under the law, propaganda is defined as the public dissemination of information about "non-traditional sexual orientation" if it is aimed at "shaping positive public opinion." Formally, there are four required elements of a violation: public nature, use of media or online platforms, the goal of fostering a positive attitude, and in some cases, deliberate distortion of information (including deepfakes).
However, lawyers immediately pointed to problems with applying these criteria. How can one practically assess whether public opinion changed as a result of a specific publication? Who will determine whether there was a "goal," and by what standards? According to lawyer Olga Didenko, those tasked with identifying violations will most likely assert the existence of such a goal without any real burden of proof — because objectively, proving it is impossible.
The core problem is the boundary between informing and propagandizing. From a legal standpoint, the distinction should lie in tone: a neutral approach constitutes informing; a dominant position favoring one viewpoint constitutes propaganda. But without concrete criteria, the assessment of tone itself becomes a matter of dispute — and a tool for repression.
Gulmira Birzhanova, head of the legal department at the Legal Media Center, offered a telling example: if a journalist covers a court case and mentions the publicly known orientation of one of the parties, does that constitute "shaping positive public opinion"? The law provides no answer.
An 18+ label does not exempt content from liability either, since the amendments apply not just to children's content but to the information sphere as a whole.
The Ministry of Culture's clarification
On March 3, the Ministry of Culture and Information responded to the wave of questions, clarifying that news, scientific, and statistical publications do not in themselves constitute a violation — provided they contain no "direct or indirect propaganda." The key criterion, according to the ministry, is the intent to shape a positive attitude.
However, in the same clarification, the ministry confirmed that the law also applies to user-generated content. Posts, reposts, and comments on social media are treated as dissemination of information, meaning private individuals can also be held liable.
Lawyer Didenko noted that even neutral news coverage of the LGBT community risks being classified as propaganda — unlike similar coverage of pedophilia cases, where the informational context (criminal charges, investigation, trial) is perceived unambiguously.
First consequences
Practical consequences emerged on day one. Users in Kazakhstan discovered that the series Rivalry — a sports drama about two hockey players who become a romantic couple — had disappeared from the HBO Max library. The show's page stopped loading, and in-app searches returned no results. HBO, which had only entered the Kazakh market in July 2025, offered no official comment.
Lawyers note that international streaming services may adopt the most cautious approach possible in these conditions, preemptively removing content to reduce legal risk.
Penalties: fines and detention
Liability is established under Article 456 of the Administrative Code. A first offense carries a fine of 20 MCI — approximately 78,640 tenge (~$155). A repeat offense carries a fine of 40 MCI (~$310) or detention for up to 10 days.
The Russian precedent
Kazakhstan is following the path of Russia, which was the first post-Soviet country to introduce a similar ban in 2013. Initially, the Russian law was limited to protecting minors, but in 2022 the wording was expanded to cover any audience. Requirements for online platforms, cinemas, and publishers were tightened. In November 2023, Russia's Supreme Court declared the "LGBT movement" extremist. The European Court of Human Rights ruled back in 2017 that the law violated freedom of expression — but domestically, it only continued to be enforced and strengthened.
A new round of amendments
Just two weeks after the law took effect, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture Aida Balayeva announced on March 18 that the law would be rewritten again — this time to bring legislation in line with the new Constitution, approved by referendum with over 87% support.
According to Balayeva, her ministry will amend 20 laws, including those on archival matters and mass media. She stated that the changes are aimed at "implementing key constitutional principles" — preserving cultural heritage, supporting national culture, strengthening the institution of the family, and developing civil society.
At the same time, Balayeva emphasized that the new Constitution "does not permit censorship" and "guarantees citizens' rights to receive and disseminate information," while also promising to strengthen "legal mechanisms for protecting honor, dignity, and business reputation." She separately highlighted family policy, calling a strong family "the foundation of a strong society," and announced work on amendments to the Code on Marriage and Family.
What exactly these formulations mean for the existing "LGBT propaganda" ban remains an open question. Declarations about free speech and the prohibition of censorship could theoretically soften the law. But the emphasis on "strengthening the family" and "protecting children" is precisely the language used to justify restrictions in both Kazakhstan and Russia.
Self-censorship
Lawyers warn that in the absence of clear criteria, the law's main effect is not punishment but self-censorship. Newsrooms and authors prefer to avoid the topic of LGBT+ entirely to minimize legal risk. According to Birzhanova, the subject was already considered sensitive, especially for state-funded media. Now, with administrative liability and vague criteria in place, the space for discussion is shrinking further.
What the next round of amendments will bring remains to be seen. But for now, the law is working exactly as critics warned: not so much punishing specific violations as creating an atmosphere in which silence is the safest option.
The package of amendments was signed by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on December 30, 2025. Notably, the "LGBT propaganda" ban was embedded within a law on archival matters. The Mazhilis approved the norms on November 12, and the Senate backed them on December 18 — despite warnings from human rights defenders and documented cases of threats and aggression against LGBT people. The following is based on legal consultations and interviews conducted by BES.media.
What counts as propaganda
Under the law, propaganda is defined as the public dissemination of information about "non-traditional sexual orientation" if it is aimed at "shaping positive public opinion." Formally, there are four required elements of a violation: public nature, use of media or online platforms, the goal of fostering a positive attitude, and in some cases, deliberate distortion of information (including deepfakes).
However, lawyers immediately pointed to problems with applying these criteria. How can one practically assess whether public opinion changed as a result of a specific publication? Who will determine whether there was a "goal," and by what standards? According to lawyer Olga Didenko, those tasked with identifying violations will most likely assert the existence of such a goal without any real burden of proof — because objectively, proving it is impossible.
The core problem is the boundary between informing and propagandizing. From a legal standpoint, the distinction should lie in tone: a neutral approach constitutes informing; a dominant position favoring one viewpoint constitutes propaganda. But without concrete criteria, the assessment of tone itself becomes a matter of dispute — and a tool for repression.
Gulmira Birzhanova, head of the legal department at the Legal Media Center, offered a telling example: if a journalist covers a court case and mentions the publicly known orientation of one of the parties, does that constitute "shaping positive public opinion"? The law provides no answer.
An 18+ label does not exempt content from liability either, since the amendments apply not just to children's content but to the information sphere as a whole.
The Ministry of Culture's clarification
On March 3, the Ministry of Culture and Information responded to the wave of questions, clarifying that news, scientific, and statistical publications do not in themselves constitute a violation — provided they contain no "direct or indirect propaganda." The key criterion, according to the ministry, is the intent to shape a positive attitude.
However, in the same clarification, the ministry confirmed that the law also applies to user-generated content. Posts, reposts, and comments on social media are treated as dissemination of information, meaning private individuals can also be held liable.
Lawyer Didenko noted that even neutral news coverage of the LGBT community risks being classified as propaganda — unlike similar coverage of pedophilia cases, where the informational context (criminal charges, investigation, trial) is perceived unambiguously.
First consequences
Practical consequences emerged on day one. Users in Kazakhstan discovered that the series Rivalry — a sports drama about two hockey players who become a romantic couple — had disappeared from the HBO Max library. The show's page stopped loading, and in-app searches returned no results. HBO, which had only entered the Kazakh market in July 2025, offered no official comment.
Lawyers note that international streaming services may adopt the most cautious approach possible in these conditions, preemptively removing content to reduce legal risk.
Penalties: fines and detention
Liability is established under Article 456 of the Administrative Code. A first offense carries a fine of 20 MCI — approximately 78,640 tenge (~$155). A repeat offense carries a fine of 40 MCI (~$310) or detention for up to 10 days.
The Russian precedent
Kazakhstan is following the path of Russia, which was the first post-Soviet country to introduce a similar ban in 2013. Initially, the Russian law was limited to protecting minors, but in 2022 the wording was expanded to cover any audience. Requirements for online platforms, cinemas, and publishers were tightened. In November 2023, Russia's Supreme Court declared the "LGBT movement" extremist. The European Court of Human Rights ruled back in 2017 that the law violated freedom of expression — but domestically, it only continued to be enforced and strengthened.
A new round of amendments
Just two weeks after the law took effect, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture Aida Balayeva announced on March 18 that the law would be rewritten again — this time to bring legislation in line with the new Constitution, approved by referendum with over 87% support.
According to Balayeva, her ministry will amend 20 laws, including those on archival matters and mass media. She stated that the changes are aimed at "implementing key constitutional principles" — preserving cultural heritage, supporting national culture, strengthening the institution of the family, and developing civil society.
At the same time, Balayeva emphasized that the new Constitution "does not permit censorship" and "guarantees citizens' rights to receive and disseminate information," while also promising to strengthen "legal mechanisms for protecting honor, dignity, and business reputation." She separately highlighted family policy, calling a strong family "the foundation of a strong society," and announced work on amendments to the Code on Marriage and Family.
What exactly these formulations mean for the existing "LGBT propaganda" ban remains an open question. Declarations about free speech and the prohibition of censorship could theoretically soften the law. But the emphasis on "strengthening the family" and "protecting children" is precisely the language used to justify restrictions in both Kazakhstan and Russia.
Self-censorship
Lawyers warn that in the absence of clear criteria, the law's main effect is not punishment but self-censorship. Newsrooms and authors prefer to avoid the topic of LGBT+ entirely to minimize legal risk. According to Birzhanova, the subject was already considered sensitive, especially for state-funded media. Now, with administrative liability and vague criteria in place, the space for discussion is shrinking further.
What the next round of amendments will bring remains to be seen. But for now, the law is working exactly as critics warned: not so much punishing specific violations as creating an atmosphere in which silence is the safest option.